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RECENT DECISIONS
APPEAL AND ERROR-RIGHT OF DEFENDANT TO NEW TRIAL \IVHERE
PLAINTIFF Is ENTITLED TO ALL OR NoNE AND VERDICT Is INTERMEDIATEIn an action on an express contrast, plaintiff sued for $ I 75o, representing the

agreed 5 per cent commission on the sale of real estate. Defendant denied the
validity of the contract, and there was no issue as to the amount of liability if
liability existed. The instruction to the jury was that plaintiff was entitled to
5 per cent commission if entitled to recover. The jury returned a verdict for
$87 5, half the amount claimed. Defendant's motion for a new trial was denied.
Held, although the verdict was unauthorized as to plaintiff, there was no
error as to defendant and he cannot comP.lain of the jury's failure to award
plaintiff the full amount to which he was entitled. Johns v. League, Duvall &
Powell, (Ga. 1947) 45 S.E. (2d) 2u.
There is some authority 1 squarely supporting the principal case, but the clear
weight of authority appears to be otherwise. Most of the cases seemingly supporting the view expressed in this case are clearly distinguishable on their facts
and disclose situations where the damages were uncertain and unliquidated. 2
Where plaintiff's damages are fixed by contract and the jury awards a fraction
of the amount claimed in disregard of the court's instructions, it being conceded
plaintiff is entitled to a new trial, why cannot defendant complain? Certainly
a verdict of this sort is open to serious suspicion, and a large number of courts
have held that the award of intermediate damages in such a case clearly indicates
a compromise by the jury, which taints the whole verdict and requires a new
trial on all issues in the case.3 Clearly, the issue of the defendant's liability is
not squarely determined by a compromise verdict. 4 Many courts have upheld
defendant's right to a new trial even in cases where damages were not entirely
certain but where, because there was no dispute as to the amount of damages and
no evidence to support an intermediate and uncommonly low award, the court
believed the verdict must have been a compromise. 5 Some courts have employed
1

Wright v. Griffey, 44 Ill. App. 115 (1892). Cf. Benedict v. Michigan Beef &
Provision Co., 115 Mich. 527, 73 N.W. 802 (1898), holding that the court will
indulge in all presumptions in favor of the validity of verdicts and will be slow to yield
to the inference of compromise.
2
See, for example, Cormier v. Martin Lumber Co., 98 Wash. 463, 167 P. 1105
(1917); Kelley v. Peoples, 192 Mo. App. 435, 182 S.W. 809 (1915); Fischer v.
Holmes, 123 Ind. 525, 24 N.E. 377 (1889).
8
Riley v. Tsagarakis; 53 R.I. 261, 165 A. 780 (1933); Holcombe v. Reynolds,
200 Ala. 190, 75 S. 938 (1917); Feldman v. Levy, 56 Misc. 563, 106 N.Y.S.
1092 (1907); Dunn v. Blue Grass Realty Co., 163 Ky. 384, 173 S. W.1122 (1915);
Alden v. Sacramento Fruit Lands Co., 137 Minn. 161, 163 N.W. 133 (1917).
4
Cases cited, note 3. See also, Bigelow v. Garwitz, 61 Hun. 624, 15 N.Y.S.
940 (1891).
.
5
Turner v. Great Northern Ry. Co., 67 N.D. 347, 272 N.W. 489 (1937),
where uncontradicted evidence showed damages of $32,585.02, verdict for $10,000
held a compromise. Stalter v. Schuyler, (N.J. 1947) 51 A. (2d) 213, where
counsel stipulated damages 'to plaintiff were $432.12, verdict for $300 held a compro-
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different reasoning in reaching the same result. Thus, it has been held that
the verdict is incorrect because contrary to law. 6 These courts have upheld
defendant's right to a new trial for the reason that, while the verdict might
have been for more than the jury found, yet defendant is injured beaause the
jurors might not have found for plaintiff at all had they felt bound to award
him the full damages claimed. 7 Other courts have said: that the verdict is
incorrect because contrary to the evidence, and have upheld· defendant's right
to a new trial on the ground that the verdict is really no more for the plaintiff
than against him; that had the jury believed plaintiff's evidence, they were
bound . to award him full damages. The award of intermediate damages, it
is said, indicates that the jury did not believe plaintiff fully established his case,
and in this situation an award of any recovery to plaintiff is unjust to defendant.8
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mise. See 98 A.L.R. 944 (1935), for cases where smallness of damages awarcted indicates compromise verdict.
6 The theory here is that when damages are certain, the instruction of the court as
to the amount of damages is an instruction on the law. The leading case is Stetson v.
Stindt, (C.C.A. 3d, 1922) 279 F. 209, where plaintiff sued on a promissory note
for $56,990.70 and verdict was for $27,439, new trial awarded defendant. See also,
TouVelle v. Farm Bureau Co-Op Exchange, II2 Ore. 476, 229 P. 83 (1924);
Kundred v. Bitler, 93 Ind. App. 691, 177 N.E. 345 (1931); Metropolitan Life Ins.
Co. v. Ray, 28 Ala. App. 357, 184 S. 282 (1938); 3 AM. JuR., Appeal & Error,
§ u45. 23 A.L.R. 305 (1923).
7 Cases•cited, note 6. In Stetson v. Stindt, (C.C.A. 3d, 1922) 279 F. 209 at 211,
the court said: "He [Defendant] was injured by being deprived of the right of a
litigant to have the jury determine his liability under the law as laid down by the
court. That liability might be for more than the jury found; yet it might be for
nothing. What his liability is, the jury refused to say; but said something else, which,
under the law and on the facts, was simply untrue...."
8 Metz v. Campbell Printing-Press Co., II Misc. 284, 32 N.Y.S. l 55 (1895);
Bressler v. McVey, 82 Kan, 341, 108 P. 97 (1910). See also, 2 THOMPSON, TRIALS,
2d ed.,§ 2606 (1912).
Some courts have held that where the verdict should be for all or none, an
intermediate verdict should not be accepted by the trial court in the first instance.
Hines v. Royce, 127 Mo. App. 718, 106 S.W. 109i (1908); Chandler v. Hines,
135 Wis. 43, II5 N.W. 339 (1908), holding that the trial court did not err in
sending the jury back to reach a correct verdict on the amount of damages.

